What Can We Learn from the Dutch Cannabis Coffeeshop Experience?
There are currently around 700 retail cannabis outlets in the Netherlands – about one per 29,000 citizens (one per 3000 in Amsterdam; Bieleman & Snippe, 2006; Bieleman et al., 2008). The industry employs 3400 workers (Bieleman & Snippe, 2006), and the owners have their own union (the Bond van Cannabis Detaillisten).
They sell somewhere between 50 and 150 metric tons of cannabis at a value of perhaps 300 to 600 million euros a year (see Appendix). They do not pay VAT – the European Court of Justice won't let them -- but they pay various income and corporate taxes (NIS News, 2010; van Dijk, 1998, pp. 381-382; van der Steen, 2010). It is estimated that a quarter of the 4.5 million tourists who visit Amsterdam go to a coffeeshop and that 10 percent of them cite that as a reason why they came (Amsterdam Tourist Information, 2008; van Laar et al., 2010).
The Dutch experience is challenging to characterize, because it is a moving target. The Dutch policy continues to evolve in response to internal and external political pressures as well as the nation's inherently pragmatic "learning by doing" orientation to drug problems. In 1995, the 30 gram limit was reduced to 5 grams, and a 500 gram limit was set for coffeeshop stocks. In 2008 the Netherlands banned tobacco smoking in the coffeeshops (and all other commercial establishments) (Stinson, 2008) and they have been attempting to close shops within 250 meters of schools (Clements, 2008).
Most importantly, beginning in the late 1970s, a set of guidelines were developed for regulating the technically illicit retail sales in open commercial establishments; as formalized by the Public Prosecution Service, coffeeshop owners are not be prosecuted for selling cannabis providing they comply with five rules (the so-called "AHOJ-G" rules):
1. "they may not sell more than 5 grams per person per day 2. they may not sell ecstasy or other hard drugs 3. they may not advertise drugs 4. they must ensure that there is no nuisance in their vicinity 5. they may not sell drugs to persons aged under 18 or even allow them on the premises.
2
The sale of cannabis will continue to be an offence. If the rules set out above are not observed, the premises are closed down and the owners or management may be prosecuted. Under the official drug guidelines, coffee shops may stock up to 500 grams of cannabis without facing prosecution. Municipalities may impose additional rules on coffee shops in order to avoid nuisance” (Openbaar Ministrie, 2010).
Enforcement of these rules didn't have real teeth until 1997, when officials began closing coffeeshops for non-compliance. Between 1997 and 2007, the number of retail cannabis outlets dropped 40 percent, from 1,179 to 702 (Bieleman et al., 2005, 2009).
In the past few years, the Dutch have had lively debates about the coffeeshop model. (See ABC, 2008; NIS News, 2006, 2008, 2010; NRC Handelsblad, 2008; IHT, 2007.) To eliminate the so-called "backdoor" problem of legal inconsistency, some officials argue that municipalities or coffeeshop owners should be allowed to legally cultivate cannabis in order. Others contend that this would violate international UN and EU agreements. Some officials have called for a complete ban on sales to non-Dutch tourists; others contend that this would violate Dutch human rights laws. But most officials, and most Dutch citizens, stand by the basic approach as an expression of Dutch gedoogcultuur (“culture of permissiveness”) and as a pragmatic "least worst" solution. (For an enlightening historical account, see Amsterdam Tourist Information, 2007.)
The purpose is not to judge the Netherlands or inform its own decisions about the future, but to see what California can learn about potential policy options and outcomes by drawing on the Dutch experience. Regardless of how one feels about the Dutch system, there is little doubt that the US and indeed the world can learn from the Dutch willingness to experiment, and their energetic and thorough efforts to document their policies and outcomes.
Robert J. MacCoun
